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A BASEBALL player under contract with a professional club is
regarded and treated as the "property" of such club and his
"sale" to another club is a constant occurrence. The "national agree-
ment" between the various professional clubs in connection with the
"reserve" provision, the most prominent feature of his contract, "mort-
gages" his services to such club for the entire period of his usefulness
as a player under pain of being precluded from obtaining employment
from any other professional club. The disposition of the players
between the clubs composing the various professional leagues is thus
fully controlled. The players need not be consulted and have no voice
in the matter except by courtesy which is generally confined to the
more prominent players vho sometimes even receive a portion of the
price for which they are sold.'
Without such rigid control, professional baseball could not exist
at least not in its present form. There would be too many changes
and an unending amount of scheming to invade the ranks of opposing
teams. Capital under such circumstances would not invest the huge
sums which now are tied up in baseball parks throughout the country.
A monopolistic control of the outstanding baseball players has therefore
developed under the national agreement which is unexampled in the
American and English law. Any professional player who resents this
control is at liberty to retire from professional baseball and (as has
happened in New York) become a common laborer in a brewery at
$20 a week.2
This system has received judicial condemnation. In a New York
case involving Harold H. Chase, the former first baseman of both the
White Sox and New York Highlanders (now the Yankees) the court
said: "The analysis of the national agreement and the rules of the
commission, controlling the services of these skilled laborers, and pro-
viding for their purchase, sale, exchange, draft, reduction, discharge
and blacklisting, would seem to establish a species of quasi-peonage,
unlawfully controlling and interfering with the personal freedom of the
men employed . . . 'Organized baseball' is now as complete a
monopoly of the baseball business for profit as any monopoly can be
made. It is in contravention of the common law, in that it invades the
right of labor as a property right, in that it invades the right to con-
'Baseball Players' Fraternity v. Boston American League Baseball Club, 166
App. Div. 484, 151 N.Y.S. 557 (1915).
2Grifin v. Brooklyn Baseball Club, 68 App. Div. 566, 73 N.Y.S. 864; affirmed:
174 N.Y. 535, 66 N.E. 1109 (1902).
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tract as a property right and in that it is a combination to restrain
and control the exercise of a profession or calling." The court further
said that there is no difference in principle between Mexican peonage
and the servitude of baseball players, that it places 10,000 skilled
laborers under the dominion of a benevolent despotism through the
operation of the monopoly created by the national agreement and that
this monopoly interferes unlawfully with the personal liberty of the
men employed, is contrary to the spirit of American institutions and
contrary to the spirit of the United States Constitution.3
Naturally, however, professional baseball players generally prefer
peonage which includes riding in sleepers, eating at good hotels, col-
lecting scrapbooks of personal newspaper references and playing the
game which they love before adoring crowds at substantial, fancy
and sometimes even fantastic salaries to the liberty, obscurity and
poverty connected with driving a brewery wagon at day laborer's
wages.
The dream of thousands and perhaps millions of American boys
is to achieve such peonage at substantial salaries. The annual hold-
outs in the ranks of professional players therefore always dwindle
rapidly as the opening days of the respective seasons draw near. The
lawfulness of the baseball agreement which professional players must
sign to become such, or to remain such, has therefore generally been
tested in the courts only during the so-called baseball wars when
sufficient opposition to the established system developed to hold out
inducements to players to violate their agreements by accepting employ-
ment from opposing clubs at increased salaries. The present American
League has grown out of one such baseball war fought at the turn of
the century. The "Federal League" uprising twenty-five years ago
produced no such lasting results but collapsed and merely contributed
new baseball parks, some of which, such as Wrigley Field in Chicago,
the home of the Chicago Cubs, are in use today. There was still
another upheaval in 1889 which has led to judicial opinions particularly
in New York and in Pennsylvania.
The first extensive and intensive discussion of the baseball con-
tract took place in connection with this baseball war in 1889. Many
years before, an English court had enjoined a famous opera singer,
who was under contract to sing for three months in an opera house,
from singing in a competing opera house during such period though the
court stated that it would not undertake to force her to perform her
contract with her first employer.4 This led the New York Supreme
*American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. Rep. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6(1914).
4Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. M. & G. 604, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 252 (1852).
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Court to state that no substantial distinction can be made between an
actor of great histrionic ability and a professional baseball player of
peculiar fitness and skill to fill a particular position. Each is sought
for his particular and peculiar fitness; each performs in public for
compensation; and each attracts customers. The refusal of either
to perform his contract results in loss to his or her employer which is
increased where such a service is rendered to a rival. Yet the court
refused to enjoin one John W. Ward, a baseball player, under contract
with the New York Baseball Club at a salary of $2,000 a year, from
transferring to another baseball club on the ground of lack of "mutual-
ity," in other words, because the player was bound indefinitely while
the employer might discharge him on ten days notice.5 The same gen-
eral result was reached at the same time in the federal courts of New
York in the case of one Ewing who in disregard of his contract with
the New York Baseball Club sought to transfer to a rival organization."
In Pennsylvania the results were not so decisive. It was indeed held
that one Hallman, who was under contract with the Philadelphia Club
which reserved him for the next year, was not bound by such reserva-
tion, it being too indefinite, and could transfer to another club.7 In
another Pennsylvania case the Harrisburg Baseball Club sought with-
out success to enjoin an Athletic Association from accepting the serv-
ices of F. U. Grant. The court disregarded the argument of the
Harrisburg Club that it would by such action be subjected to financial
loss.e However, in still another Pennsylvania case the court enjoined
the player from carrying out his purpose. The Kansas City Club in
1889 paid to the St. Paul Baseball Club $3,300 for the release of one
Pickett of which sum Pickett had received $800. A salary of $340
per month had been regularly paid to Pickett in 1889 though he was
sick and unable to play during a large part of the season. In October
1889, Pickett had agreed to play for the Kansas City Club in 1890 at a
salary of $2,200. Of this salary he had received two monthly advances
of $100 each when he in February 1890, notified the Kansas City Club
that he intended to play baseball in 1890 for the Players' League of
Philadelphia. Under these particularly aggravating facts the court
issued the injunction prayed for. In doing so it stated that a negative
covenant need not be express in order to be enforceable and that every
express covenant embraces within its scope an implied promise not to
5 Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779, 24 Abb. N.C. 393 (1890).
6 Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 24 Abb. N.C. 419, 42 Fed. 198, 7 L.R.A.
381 (1890).
7 Philadelphia Baseball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 57, 47 Leg. Int. 130(1890).8 Harrisburg Baseball Club v. Athletic Ass'n., 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 337 (1890).
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do anything which will prevent the person making the promise from
doing the act which he has agreed to do.9
At the turn of the century there was but one major baseball league
consisting of twelve clubs in different cities known as the "National
League and American Association of Professional Baseball Clubs." In
consequence of the baseball war of 1902 it was succeeded by the
National League and the American League, each consisting of eight
clubs. Napoleon Lajoie, the peerless second baseman, became the
central figure in the court aftermath of this war. He was under con-
tract with the Philadelphia Club, but transferred to the Cleveland
team, which accordingly for many years after was known as the
"Naps." He was so outstanding in his day and perhaps for all time
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said of him: "He may not
be the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is certainly a bright par-
ticular star." His salary then of $2400 a year would be considered
beggarly today but that was the year 1902. The Philadelphia Baseball
Club succeeded in obtaining an injunction against him. The court held
that the lack of mutuality in the contract did not matter, and that
though the club could discharge him on ten days notice Lajoie was
bound to play with Philadelphia for the rest of his playing days. The
court in consequence issued an injunction forbidding Lajoie from
playing with the Cleveland Club.'O However, since the injunction was
issued by a state court its effect was negligible. Lajoie played in the
other cities of the circuit and played against Philadelphia when Phila-
delphia played in Cleveland. The order merely prevented him from
playing in Philadelphia and, thus, deprived the citizens of that city of
the privilege of seeing him in action. Curiously enough he ended his
baseball career in Philadelphia as a member of the Philadelphia
Nationals.
An entirely different result was reached in the same war by a
federal court also sitting in Pennsylvania in an action brought by the
Brooklyn Club to prevent one McGuire from transferring his services
to another club. The court held that the contract was unenforceable
partly because McGuire was not an outstanding player, partly because
of the lack of mutuality.11
The baseball war of 1914 which led to the creation and operation
(for a time) of the Federal League has resulted in very important
lawsuits. The case of Armando Marsans, the Cuban player, whose
attempted transfer from the Cincinnati Reds to a Federal League
9 American Ass'n. Baseball Club of Kansas City v. Picket and the Players'
National League Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 232 (1890).
10 Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 At. 973, 58 L.R.A. 227, 90
Am. Rep. 627 (1902).
"'Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 Fed. 782 (E.D. Penn. 1902).
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club was enjoined on condition that the Cincinnati club furnish a bond
of $13,000 ;12 and the case of George H. Johnson, from the same club,
which resulted in a victory for Johnson on the ground of lack of
mutuality13 arose at this period.
More outstanding, however, was the case of William Killefer, the
famous catcher of the Philadelphia Nationals, who subsequently with
his even more famous battery-mate, Grover Cleveland Alexander, was
transferred to the Chicago Cubs and who ended his baseball career in
St. Louis some years ago. Killefer in 1913 had signed a contract with
the Philadelphia Club containing the reserve clause. Though the
Chicago Federal League Club, the Whales, knew of this it induced
Killefer to sign a contract for $5,833.33 per season with it in 1914.
Nevertheless, Killefer shortly after signed another contract with his
old employer at a salary of $6,500 per season. The Whales manage-
ment sought to enjoin him from playing with Philadelphia. The trial
court was not favorably impressed with Killefer's methods. It said
that he was not only a unique and exceptional player but also a person
on whose pledged word little reliance could be placed. It said that the
conduct of both Killefer and: the Whales was open to criticism and
censure and that since they had acted wrongfully the court would
neither adjust their differences nor balance their equities. It said of the
conduct of the Whales management that it did not square with the
vital and fundamental principles of equity, and touched to the quick
the dignity of the court and controlled its decision regardless of all
other considerations.' 4 The Circuit Court of Appeals promptly affirmed
this judgment stating that the reserve clause indeed is ineffective as a
contract, but creates on the part of the player an obligation to endeavor
in good faith to reach an agreement with his club concerning his future
services, and that the action of the Whales was a legal fraud on the
rights of the Philadelphia team to have the reserve provision avoided
only through an honest effort. The court then held that no such effort
had been made, but that the reserve provision was merely ignored
to the manifest injury of the Philadelphia Club. The injunction con-
sequently was denied. 15
The player of greatest prominence to become involved in a lawsuit
in the Federal League controversy was Harold H. Chase, who was
then considered the outstanding first baseman in the game and was
connected with the Chicago White Sox. He in 1914 signed a contract
with the Buffalo Federal League team and the White Sox manage-
ment sought to enjoin him from playing in Buffalo. His special, unique
12 Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Armando Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914).
'. Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914).
'4 Weegman v. Killefer, 215 Fed. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914).
15 Weegman v. Killefer, 215 Fed. 289, 131 C.C.A. 558 (1914).
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and extraordinary characteristics as a baseball player were so pro-
nounced that his new employer arranged on his arrival at Buffalo for a
"Hal. Chase Day" the purpose being of course, not so much to honor
Chase as to fill the Buffalo park with customers and the pockets of
its owners with money. The New York Supreme Court held that the
contract of Chase with the White Sox lacked mutuality and hence
would not be enforced. It further intimated that the national agree-
ment does not violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' 6
The thought just expressed soon found its echo in the United States
Supreme Court. When the Federal League had dissolved after a short
and frantic existence, the Buffalo Club of that League sued the three
members of the national commission and the sixteen baseball clubs
which made up the National and American leagues and obtained a
verdict of $80,000 on which judgment was entered for $240,000 under
the treble damage clause of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The real
grievance of the plaintiff was that the baseball agreements signed by
major and minor league players had been effective to prevent the
Federal League from securing a sufficient number of capable players
to compete successfully with the older organizations. It was claimed
that baseball thus organized was interstate commerce and that the
monopoly obtained by the defendants violated the Anti-Trust Act.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the act
of playing baseball games for profit is not commerce but is sport, and
that the profit features and the incidental transportation of bats and
gloves and other baseball equipment from state to state do not change
the nature of the game.' 7
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals in an opinion written by Justice Holmes. The holding was
that the business of giving baseball exhibitions is purely an intrastate
affair. True, games are arranged between clubs from various states.
However, the fact that the players in order to meet on a particular
diamond cross state lines, is not enough to make the business inter-
state. Such transportation is incidental rather than essential. A firm of
lawyers sending out a member to argue a case in another state or a
Chautauqua lecture bureau sending out lecturers all over the United
States do not engage in commerce, because the emissaries go to other
states. Neither do baseball players engage in commerce merely because
they travel from state to state between games.' s
The national agreement and the baseball contracts drawn in accord-
ance with it have thus proved their effectiveness by holding the baseball
'
6 American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 86 Misc. Rep. 441
(1914).
27National League of Professional Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
269 Fed. 681, 50 App. D.C. 165 (1920).
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structure together through all the storm and stress which it has passed.
Individual players whose desire naturally is to increase their salaries
are prevented from destroying the very structure which supports them.
Abuses which have developed have in large part been corrected. It
was indeed the "Black Sox scandal" (the intentional "throwing" of the
World Series of 1919 by certain White Sox players) and certain
fraudulent practices in connection with player trades between various
clubs which led to the appointment of former Federal District Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis as baseball commissioner, whose decision
is made final by the agreement of the parties in advance of need. His
position is exactly that of a common law arbitrator. He is a private,
extraordinary judge to whose decision the matters in controversy are
referred by the consent of the parties. His decisions in effect become
a part of the national agreement and as such are enforced by the courts
as any other contract. Far reaching action on his part, such as forc-
ing certain clubs to break up their "farm" systems, thus finds its legal
basis.
Outside of the reserve provision a baseball contract is a perfectly
binding contract. A player, therefore, whose contract does not con-
tain the ten days clause and who plays the average good game of ball
may recover damages where he is discharged in the middle of his con-
tract without any reason. The courts will not in the face of the express
provisions of the contract read into it by custom or usage the right to
discharge a player on ten days notice.1 In consequence baseball con-
tracts now contain this clause. Under it the player's connection with
the club may be severed by the club at any time with or without any
reason. The players thus are kept on their toes to the great advantage
of themselves, their employers and the baseball public. Of course a
club which wishes to discharge a player under this clause thus making
him a "free agent" must so state. If it instead attempts to transfer
him to another club which refuses to accept him it escapes liability
because it might have acted under the clause.20 The contract being
one which has been dictated by the employer will in a doubtful case be
construed in favor of the player. The waivers by other members of
the same league must therefore be proved by the employer and the
salary during the direct transfer period cannot be reduced over the
protest of the player.21
Is Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 42 Sup.
Ct 465, 66 L.Ed. 898, 26 A.L.R. 357 (1920).19 Baltimore Baseball Club & E. Co. v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, 28 At. 279, 44 Am.
St. Rep. 304 (1894).
2o Griffin v. Brooklyn Baseball Club, 68 App. Div. 566, 73 N.Y.S. 864; affirmed:
174 N.Y. 535, 66 N.E. 1109 (1903).
21 Baseball Players' Fraternity v. Boston Club, 166 N.Y. App. 488, 151 N.Y.S.
557 (1915).
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